Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics Symposium - The Phoenix Rises again: The Nondelegation Doctrine from Constitutional and Policy Perspectives: Democracy and Delegation by Schoenbrod, David
DigitalCommons@NYLS 
Articles & Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
1998 
Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics Symposium - 
The Phoenix Rises again: The Nondelegation Doctrine from 
Constitutional and Policy Perspectives: Democracy and 
Delegation 
David Schoenbrod 
New York Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters 
Recommended Citation 
20 Cardozo L. Rev. 731 (1998-1999) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
SYMPOSIUM
DELEGATION AND DEMOCRACY:
A REPLY TO MY CRITICS
David Schoenbrod*
INTRODUCTION
High officials tell us that we can be proud to live in a democ-
racy because we have elected them. That tale does not altogether
convince voters today. Large majorities tell pollsters that govern-
ment has somehow eluded their control
Nor should the tale be convincing. The Constitution estab-
lished an indirect democracy. Indirect democracy works only if
the people's elected representatives assume personal responsibility
for the key decisions on the scope of government. To impose such
responsibility, the Framers, elitists though they were, structured
the Constitution to force members of Congress to take responsi-
bility for decisions to increase the scope of government. Article I
of the Constitution establishes as a prerequisite for the most im-
portant decisions to increase the scope of government-imposing
laws, levying taxes, appropriating money, and committing armed
forces to combat-that such actions be approved by majorities in
both houses of Congress.' Their votes must be recorded and
therefore be made available to their constituents if as few as
twenty percent of the legislators request it.3 So, government may
not expand its powers in any controversial way unless voters know
just whom to blame if blame there be.
There is, of course, one other elected federal official in our
constitutional scheme-the President-who also has a role in
* Professor, New York Law School. My thanks to Harry Wellington and the confer-
ence participants, especially Marci Hamilton and Peter Schuck, for their helpful comments
on an earlier draft. My thanks also to Phillip Caal and Floyd Englehardt, New York Law
School class of 1998, for their excellent research assistance.
1 See THE HARWOOD GROUP, THE KETTERING FUND, CITIZENS AND POLITICS: A
VIEW FROM MAIN STREET iii (1991).
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
3 See id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
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growing the government.4 The President's role, however, was de-
signed not to enhance democratic accountability, but rather to
check rash or partisan decisions by Congress.'
Although the Constitution established congressional respon-
sibility as the main engine of our indirect democracy, members of
Congress have evaded responsibility by delegating legislative pow-
ers to the executive branch. The result, as I have argued, is that
democracy suffers.6
My argument has prompted criticism by participants in this
symposium. For example, Professor Jerry Mashaw, who had been
scheduled to speak, but did not, contends that delegation does no
harm to democracy;7 Professor Dan Kahan contends that democ-
racy is a meaningless concept;8 and Professor Peter Schuck argues
that delegation is a policy choice that Congress is entitled to
make.9 This Article responds to each of them after placing the
question of delegation's impact on democracy in historical context.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ELITIST EXCUSES FOR DELEGATION
Jerry Mashaw and Dan Kahan are not the first to try to ex-
plain away the harm that delegation does to democracy. Rather,
they are the rearguard in a parade of futility.10 The effort to square
delegation with democracy is pervasively futile because the drive
for delegation, from the beginning of the twentieth century,
stemmed from a desire to reduce government's accountability to
ordinary voters.
A. How the Modern Elite Undermined Accountability
The Constitution gave voters real control over government
during most of the nineteenth century, according to historian Rob-
4 The President must accept personal responsibility either by introducing a declara-
tion of war or approving a statute. Should the President not approve a statute, then it is
enacted only if two-thirds of the lawmakers in both houses override his veto. See id. art. I,
§ 7, cl. 2.
5 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Marci Hamilton, Rep-
resentation and Delegation, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807 (1999).
6 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
7 See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 139-40 (1997).
8 See Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999).
9 See Peter Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 775 (1999).
10 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 131.
[Vol. 20:731732
DELEGATION AND DEMOCRACY
ert H. Wiebe.1 The democracy was far from perfect; only white
men could vote. Nonetheless, high officials did have to account to
ordinary people who were thought fully entitled to a meaningful
say in the role that government played in their lives.12
That democracy was undercut at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century, according to Professor Wiebe, by the rise of what he
calls "the national class." 3 The national class are the leaders and
budding leaders of the institutions with clout on the national scene:
the nationally oriented corporations and unions, the nationally
oriented quarters of the professions and media, the nationally
prestigious universities, and of course the federal government it-
self.
The national class thought that ordinary people should not
have the power to hold government accountable. That power
should come not from what ordinary people pride themselves on-
self-support-but rather from what the national class had to of-
fer-specialized knowledge. 4 Members of the national class
thought, and many still feel, that experts armed with science and
insulated from politics were better equipped to govern than
elected officials accountable to ordinary people.
In order to shift control of government from voters to experts,
the national class supported two basic changes in American gov-
ernment. First, it set out to discourage voting by the lower classes,
particularly recent immigrants and freed slaves. Poll taxes and
stricter voter qualifications were aimed not just at African-
Americans, but also at all races of the lower class. These restric-
tions contributed to a sharp drop in voter participation. 5 In addi-
tion, changes in law restricted the use of public spaces for the pub-
lic electioneering by parties and other fraternal organizations that
had previously played an integral role in attracting the lower class
to the polls in droves.16
Second, the national class sought to insulate the government
from accountability at the polls. It campaigned to transfer gov-
ernmental power from institutions that were most accountable to
ordinary voters to institutions more in the control of the national
11 See ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1995).
12 See id. at 65, 85.
13 Id. at 141.
14 See id. at 142-44.
15 See id. at 135.
16 See id. at 134-37, 164-65.
1999]
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
class. 7 It succeeded; power was transferred from the states to the
national government and, within the national government, from
Congress to the executive and the judiciary. 8 From its inception,
the core purpose of delegation was to undercut democratic ac-
countability.
Government by expert came to the fore at the national level
during World War I; it grew under Herbert Hoover who ran for
President as the "Great Engineer," that is, the great expert; and it
grew still more under President Franklin Roosevelt. According to
Professor Wiebe:
What Hoover's New Era modeled, Roosevelt's New Deal ex-
panded and refined. It would be absurd to minimize the differ-
ences in policy, mood, and leadership between the two admini-
strations: millions of Americans understood. But popular
participation in government was not one of them. Despite the
image of an approachable president and his open government,
New Deal decisions occurred even more commonly than ever
behind Washington's closed doors. . . . Thurman Arnold's
Folklore of American Capitalism (1937), often cited as the New
Deal's most significant commentary on government, derisively
dismissed the very thought of popular rule.
* * * Policy itself fragmented into a multitude of exclusive
dialogues among administrative officials, congressional commit-
tees, and powerful citizens. By the 1940s it was quite common
for the same cluster of officials and citizens to write a law in pri-
vate, then execute it in private, with just a quick public peek
into the process as it was enacted. Few laws were designed for
more than a tiny minority to comprehend. 9
World War II, and later the Cold War provided a succession
of new reasons to further centralize power in Washington, par-
ticularly in the executive branch. Going to war in Korea without
congressional approval completed what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
has called the "capture by the Presidency of the most vital of na-
tional decisions, the decision to go to war."20
Consider how far the top national leadership-Congress and
the President, Democrats and Republicans alike-have gone to in-
sulate Congress from responsibility for the most important exer-
cises of national power. As I was writing the initial draft of this
Article, four instances came to mind. First, President William
17 See id. at 136-37.
18 See id. at 173-80, 206-07, 217-22.
19 Id. at 207.
20 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY ix (1973).
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Clinton cooly contemplated an attack upon Iraq without asking for
congressional authorization. President Clinton, like his predeces-
sor, George Bush, seems to think that he can launch a premedi-
tated military attack without Congressional approval." Rather
than insisting upon doing its duty under the Constitution to decide
whether to commit our armed forces, Congress has found it con-
venient to delegate that decision to the President. As John Hart
Ely persuasively argued in War and Responsibility,22 such an ar-
rangement is both unconstitutional and likely to get us into more
conflicts because of the tendency of presidents to use foreign bat-
tles to divert attention from domestic embarrassments. Second,
the Line Item Veto Act23 delegated to the president authority to
unilaterally repeal spending items and certain provisions of the tax
code.24 Senator Patrick Moynihan stated that the line item veto
was a "formula for executive tyranny ... [and that i]f L.B.J. had
had this power, we would have had Nero."25  Fortunately, the
United States Supreme Court has since held this act unconstitu-
tional.26 Third, Congress pervasively delegates to unelected agency
officials the power to impose regulatory laws on society. Fourth,
Congress has begun to delegate to agencies the power to impose
taxes.27
We now have war, regulation, and taxation without represen-
tation.
B. The Supreme Court's Attempts to Square
Delegation with Democracy
For well over a century after the adoption of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibits members
of Congress from bestowing upon others their personal responsi-
21 As Congress was drafting competing resolutions to authorize President Bush to send
troops to Saudi Arabia, Bush told reporters, "I don't think I need [congressional author-
ity] .... I have the authority to fully implement the United States resolutions .... Many
attorneys have so advised me." William Scally, Congress Heads Toward Fateful Vote on
Persian Gulf War, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Jan. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Arcnws File.
22 JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY (1993).
23 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (Supp. II. 1996). The Supreme Court held LIVA unconstitu-
tional in Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
24 See Walter Shapiro, The Loneliest Job in the World, Except for All the Lawyers,
USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 1998, at 6A.
25 Id.
26 See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
27 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7661(a)(b)(3) (1994); Telecommunications Act of
1996, 47 U.S.C. § 609 (Supp. II. 1997); see also David Schoenbrod & Marci Hamilton,
Congress Passes the Buck: Your Tax Buck, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1998, at A10.
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bility for enacting laws.28 When national class legislation began to
delegate lawmaking authority to federal agencies at the turn of the
century, there had to be a rationale to square the delegation with
the Constitution.29
1. The First Rationale: Congress Did Not Delegate
The first rationale put forth was that the statutes did not dele-
gate the power to make the laws but rather only granted the power
to enforce laws enacted by Congress. 0 The supposed laws were,
from my perspective, not laws at all because they provided no dis-
cernible rule of conduct. Nonetheless, this first rationale was more
naive than disingenuous. The national class had the conceit that
its expertise could pour meaning into these empty congressional
formulations, and so doing was more akin to factfinding than law-
making. Thus, the national class could think there was clear
meaning in statutory standards that, to a modern mind, were
hopelessly vague.3
Many scholars have incorrectly concluded from this first ra-
tionale that the nondelegation doctrine was never more than a
dead letter before reactionary justices invoked it in 1935 to strike
down early New Deal legislation.32 But, on at least three occasions
prior to 1935, the Supreme Court struck down federal statutes for
delegating lawmaking authority.33 Two of those statutes delegated
lawmaking authority to state legislatures and a third to courts and
juries. State legislatures and juries are not the sort of institution
controlled by the national class. The Supreme Court was quicker
to notice implicit delegations of legislative power when the dele-
28 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 30-31, 155-56.
29 See id. at 31-35.
30 See generally Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 690-91 (1892) (upholding a statute that
delegated power to the President to suspend the free importation of certain goods when
those exporting countries laid tariffs on U.S. goods because Congress had the authority
"to invest the President with large discretion in matters arising out of the execution of
statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations").
31 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 31-36.
32 See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 7, at 133.
33 See, e.g., Washington v. W.C. Dawson, 264 U.S. 219 (1924) (affirming the decision of
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), which held that Congress could not
delegate to states the application of state worker compensation laws in admiralty cases);
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) (striking down a statute that
made it a crime to charge "unjust or unreasonable" prices for "any necessaries" as uncon-
stitutional because it delegated legislative power to courts and juries); Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (striking down a statute that instructed federal courts
to apply state worker compensation law in resolving admiralty cases).
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gates were not members of the national class.34 The same class
bias persists in Supreme Court delegation cases to the present day,
as delegations to agencies generally are upheld, while delegations
to other official bodies are reviewed under labels other than
"delegation" and often are found constitutionally deficient.35
2. The Next Rationale: The "Intelligible Principle Test"
As Congress began to delegate lawmaking power more bla-
tantly, the Court could no longer pretend that there was no delega-
tion. So, in J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States,3 6 decided in
1928, the Supreme Court held that Congress could delegate the
power to make the law if it provided "an intelligible principle" to
guide the agency lawmakers.37 The Court did not, however, ex-
plicitly admit that Congress could delegate the power to make law.
That did not come until five years later, when it said that the stat-
ute in Hampton delegated legislative power in a "permissible"-
that is, a minor-way.38  But the implication was clear in 1928.
Even such a fervent believer in government by expert as
President-elect Herbert Hoover reacted angrily at the departure
from constitutional tradition: "There is only one commission to
which delegation of that authority can be made. That is the great
commission of [the voters'] own choosing, the Congress of the
34 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 634
(1980) (striking down a health standard promulgated by OSHA, which limited occupa-
tional exposure to benzene from ten parts benzene per million parts of air to one part ben-
zene per million parts of air because OSHA's arrival at this figure was not premised on
concrete findings, but rather on the "assumptions" that "leukemia might result from expo-
sure to 10 ppm and that the number of cases [of leukemia] might be reduced by lowering
the exposure level to 1 ppm"); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S.
336, 342 (1974) (affirming that Congress can delegate powers to agencies "setting stan-
dards to guide their determination" but not reaching the question of whether the regula-
tion before it met the intelligible principle requirement).
35 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a provision of
an INS regulation that allowed a one-house veto of an executive decision to allow an alien
to remain in the United States because such an action was legislation that required passage
by a majority of both houses of Congress and presentation to the President); Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 105 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a U.S. Civil Service
Commission ("CSC") regulation denying non-U.S. citizens employment in federal service
despite the argument by the CSC that the regulation was mandated by Congress, the
President, or both, because the Court was "not willing to presume that.., defendants
[were] deliberately fostering an interest [of Congress, the President or both which was] so
far removed from [its] normal responsibilities"); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568-69,
572 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute that made it a crime to "pub-
licly ... treat[] contemptuously the flag of the United States" because the statute was
vague).
36 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
37 Id. at 409.
38 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (discussing the Hampton decision).
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of [the voters'] own choosing, the Congress of the United States
and the President. It is the only commission which can be held re-
sponsible to the electorate."39
New Deal legislation forced the recognition that Congress had
delegated its legislative power in a manifestly major way. Two de-
cisions, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan" and A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States,4 struck down various provisions of
the National Recovery Act for delegating legislative power with-
out "an intelligible principle."42 Although it is fashionable to decry
these decisions as the product of reactionaries, Justice Brandeis
joined in both majority opinions while Justice Cardozo dissented
in Panama Refining but concurred in Schechter.
The threat posed by the court-packing plan and the appoint-
ment of new justices made it necessary for the Supreme Court to
find some guise under which to uphold major delegations of legis-
lative power. One tactic was for Congress to fill the delegating
statutes with enough palaver about statutory goals so that the
Court would at least have something to talk about in concluding
that the statute provided "an intelligible principle."43 The pretense
was that Congress was somehow still in charge. As everyone who
had seen Mr. Smith Goes to Washington" knew, the whole idea
was to take the key policy decisions from the selfish people in
Congress and give them to the agencies controlled by the good
man in the White House. A more fitting rationale had to be
found.
3. The Final Rationale: Congress Can Repeal Agency Laws
The Supreme Court's final rationale is that delegation does no
real harm to democracy because Congress retains the power to en-
39 J.S. Cotton, Letter, Flexible Tariffs, 13 CONST. REV. 100-01 (1929) (quoting Presi-
dent-elect Hoover's speech of Oct. 15, 1928).
40 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
41 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
42 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 537-38; Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430.
43 See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249-53 (1947) (holding constitutional the
Homeowners' Loan Act of 1933 despite the claim that it unconstitutionally delegated con-
gressional power to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board because there were adequate
standards to guide the policy of the board); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426
(1944) (holding constitutional the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, promulgated by
the Office of Price Administration, because the necessary standards to gauge whether the
will of Congress had been obeyed were present); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307
U.S. 533, 574-78 (1939) (holding constitutional the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture, because it contained the necessary
standards for determining the intent of Congress).
44 MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures 1939).
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act a statute, repealing whatever agency-made laws that it does not
approve." This rationale reverses the burden that the Constitution
places on those who want to expand the powers of government by
imposing a new law. Under the Constitution, the proponents of
the new law must bear the burden of getting it approved by the
House, the Senate, and the President.46 Under the last rationale,
inaction by either House is sufficient for the agency-made law to
stay in effect. There are, of course, many ways to prevent a con-
troversial bill from coming to the floor for a vote, and legislators
are only too willing to avoid controversial votes. As a result, laws
are sustained without any legislative accountability.
The Supreme Court understands perfectly well that legislators
bear little responsibility for inaction, and so it refuses to rely upon
legislative inaction in interpreting statutes.47 It is utterly unprinci-
pled to claim that legislative inaction, somehow squares delegation
with Article I of the Constitution. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
come close to recognizing this much. In INS v. Chadha,48 it stated,
"[t]o allow Congress to evade the strictures of the Constitution
and in effect enact Executive proposals into law by mere silence
cannot be squared with Art. I. ' 49
Congress has recently provided us with a laboratory experi-
ment to see if legislators are willing to step forward to repeal
agency laws with which they disagree. In the name of congres-
sional responsibility, Congress enacted the Congressional Review
Act,5 0 which sets up expedited procedures for floor votes to repeal
new agency laws before they go into effect.51 In the first eighteen
months of this procedure, agencies promulgated thousands of
regulations, many of which have been criticized by legislators. But
the Senate voted on only one of them, and the House on none. 2
The experiment shows that legislators react to responsibility as
vampires do to garlic-they flee. 3
45 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 181-83.
46 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
47 See, e.g., Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969) ("Legislative silence is a poor bea-
con to follow in discerning the proper statutory route.").
48 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
49 Id. at 958 n.23.
50 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (Supp. 111996).
51 See id.
52 See The Role of Congress in Monitoring Administrative Rulemaking: Hearings on
H.R. 1704 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1 (1997) (testimony of Rep. Kelley).
53 Professor Schuck points out that agencies may have changed the regulations they
proposed to avoid defeat in Congress. See Schuck, supra note 9, at 787-88. But he misun-
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In sum, with the Supreme Court's blessing, Congress has
transformed its responsibility for the laws from a right of the vot-
ers to an option of the legislators.
C. The Harm to Democracy
The problem that legislators have with the Constitution is that
they must take responsibility for both the benefits and costs of new
laws. However they vote, they will offend some constituents. Ri-
vals for reelection can easily search the Congressional Record to
discover their opponent's voting record. The incumbents do not
know in advance which of their votes will come back to haunt
them at the next election and therefore have to worry about the
wishes of their constituents on every vote.
Delegation has allowed legislators to rewrite the ground rules
of democracy to help entrench themselves in office. They can pre-
tend to deliver the best of everything to everyone by commanding
agencies to promulgate laws to achieve popular statutorily pre-
scribed goals. 4 The statutes are framed so that legislators can skirt
the hard choices. This permits legislators to claim much of the
credit for the benefits of the laws but shift to the unelected agency
officials much of the blame for the inevitable costs and disap-
pointments when the agency fails to deliver all the benefits prom-
ised. Come the next election, rival candidates will search the Con-
gressional Record in vain for evidence on where the incumbent
stood on the hard choices. Moreover, when some constituents
complain that the agency has delivered too few of the benefits
promised, and other constituents complain that the agency has im-
posed too much cost, the incumbent can build electoral support
and raise funds by doing casework. Legislators can do casework
for both sides in the same regulatory dispute because casework,
unlike votes on the floor of Congress, is not publicly recorded.5
Delegation thus allows members of Congress to function as
ministers, who express popular aspirations (through enacting lofty
statutory goals) and tend to their flocks (by doing casework),
rather than lawmakers who must make hard choices in passing
laws. In a book that argues that delegation has enhanced legisla-
tors' chances of reelection, Morris Fiorina writes:
So long as... congressmen.., function principally as national
derstands my point. The agencies still promulgated regulations that drew substantial criti-
cism in Congress, yet the legislators contrived to avoid voting on them.
54 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 89-90.
55 See id. at 101-02.
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policy makers.., reasonably close congressional elections will
naturally result. For every voter a congressman pleases by a
policy stand he will displease someone else. The consequence is
a marginal district. But if we have incumbents who deempha-
size controversial policy positions and instead place heavy em-
phasis on nonpartisan, nonprogrammatic constituency service..
• the resulting blurring of political friends and enemies is suffi-
cient to shift the district out of the marginal camp.5 6
With delegation, legislators can escape being ejected from of-
fice except upon grounds that would oust a minister from the pul-
pit-scandal. In those exceptional cases when incumbents do lose
an election, their defeat is far more likely to be caused by some es-
capade or chicanery than by how they shaped the law.57 En-
trenched encumbency is a marker for what is a profound prob-
lem-that legislators have rewritten the ground rules of
government to evade responsibility.
II. PROFESSOR MASHAW'S POST Hoc
RATIONALIZATIONS FOR DELEGATION
Jerry Mashaw argues that delegation does no harm to democ-
racy and therefore distances himself not only from the initial pro-
ponents of delegation, but its modern proponents, most of whom
make no such claim as well.5 To reconcile delegation with democ-
racy at this stage would require a counterintuitive, post hoc ration-
alization of heroic proportions. If anyone has the intelligence and
verve to construct such a rationalization, it is Jerry Mashaw. His
recent book, entitled Greed, Chaos, and Government,59 is terrific,
but its effort to reconcile delegation with democracy has deep
problems. To demonstrate, I will examine each of his rationales.
A. Mashaw I: Delegation Does Not Stop Us from Picking
Legislators Whose Ideologies Accord with Our Own
Mashaw asks, and I quote him at length to give his argument
its full force:
56 MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONES OF THE WASHINGTON ESTAB-
LISHMENT 36-37 (1977) (quoting RANDALL RIPLEY, CONGRESS: PROCESS AND POLICY
(1975)).
57 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 104-05.
58 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323
(1987); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to
Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391 (1987). Professors Pierce and Stewart argue that
delegation is necessary or enhances welfare. I deal with those arguments in
SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 107-52.
59 MASHAW, supra note 7.
1999]
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
Do we really want to choose our representatives (or hold them
accountable) on the basis of specific votes concerning specific
legislation which, but for constitutional necessity (a nondelega-
tion doctrine with bite), they would have cast in more general
terms? How exactly does it help us in choosing legislators to
judge them on the basis of preference expressions that are not
the expressions they would give, but for the constitutional ne-
cessity of being specific?
Even if we were to imagine that statutory precision would
be informative, it is hard to envisage how rational voter calcula-
tion is appreciably improved. When one votes for Congressper-
son X, presumably one votes on the basis of a prediction about
what X will do in the next time period in the legislature. How
much better off are voters likely to be in making that predic-
tion-that is, in determining how well Congressperson X is
likely to represent them over a range of presently unspecified
issues-by knowing that he or she voted yes or no on the spe-
cific language in certain specific bills in some preceding legisla-
tures?
After all, the voter will also know that X could not have
controlled all or even a substantial portion of the language of
those bills. Votes must have been cast "all things considered."
Therefore, when making a general appraisal of X's likely be-
havior in the future, it is surely much more important that vot-
ers know the general ideological tendencies that inform those
votes (prolabor, probusiness, prodisarmament, prodefense)
than that X votes for or against the particular language of [a]
particular bill. I know of no one who argues that statutory
vagueness prevents the electorate from being informed on the
general proclivities of their representatives. 60
Actually, Mashaw does know someone "who argues that
statutory vagueness prevents the electorate from being informed
on the general proclivities of their representatives," and it is I. As
Mashaw states a few pages later:
David Schoenbrod clearly seems to believe that more spe-
cific information is always better information for the purposes
of democratic accountability. In his view, "delegation allows
legislators to convey information selectively, withholding opin-
ions about the hard choices while providing opinions that em-
brace popular aspirations. The Clean Air Act and many other
regulatory statutes have passed by wide margins for this reason,
not because Congress reached a consensus on difficult sub-
60 Id. at 139-40.
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jects." Schoenbrod continues: "The ideological poses that leg-
islators strike and the laws that emerge from agencies often
bear little resemblance to each other.... Indeed delegation
makes it possible for legislators to espouse internally inconsis-
tent ideologies (for example, avoiding economic dislocation and
protecting health). They need not join issue over inconsisten-
cies because they are talking at the symbolic level of goals
rather than at the concrete level of rules."
... I have no quarrel with Schoenbrod that legislators do all
these things in the context of broad delegations of authority to
administrators. My argument is that not all of these things are
unqualifiedly bad, and that those things that do reduce account-
ability are equally available to legislators in the context of en-
acting highly specific legislation.
The Clean Air Act that Schoenbrod uses as an example for
his view as easily supports mine. There are indeed some critical
gaps in this statute and its many amendments that leave sub-
stantial policy discretion to administrators. On the other hand,
the statute goes on for hundreds of pages, many of them con-
taining hypertechnical provisions that few citizens could possi-
bly understand. Moreover, to the extent that the Clean Air Act
and its amendments do things that dramatically depart from
citizens' expectations I would suggest that they are largely in
the detailed provisions, not the broad aspirational sections.
Voters do not read bills and would have little chance of under-
standing most of them if they did. Hence, legislators can selec-
tively convey information about legislation whether they legis-
late specifically or generally.61
While Mashaw and I agree on much, I still think he is pro-
foundly wrong. For starters, he conflates whether the statute is
specific or general with whether the statute states the law or dele-
gates.62 As Mashaw himself points out, the Clean Air Act dele-
gates lawmaking authority in the most exhaustingly specific terms.
In contrast, the one section of the 1970 Clean Air Act that actually
stated the law-the provision requiring new car makers to reduce
emissions of three specified pollutants by ninety percent-is com-
paratively simple in its basic concept.63 It is not the detail for
61 Id. at 146-47.
62 My book draws this distinction early and often. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at
9-10, 43, 135-36, 142-44, 181-84.
63 See Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970 § 202(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1) (1994)).
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which the legislators are responsible, but rather the law enacted.
When Congress enacts a law, it must take responsibility not only
for the benefits promised, but also for the duties imposed. But
when Congress delegates, its fingerprints are not left on the duties
imposed on the public, and the more detail included in the delega-
tion, the easier it is for legislators to obscure their responsibility
for the eventual costs and disappointments.64 My book contains
two extended case studies, one being the Clean Air Act, which
show precisely how legislators use delegation and the related phe-
nomenon of casework to give voters an impression of their ideol-
ogy that differs from how they actually exercise their power.65
Mashaw argues that statutes that do not delegate will not
make legislators accountable because voters do not read statutes.
Thus, legislators can characterize their actions as they choose.66
Mashaw is both right and wrong. It is true that voters do not read
statutes, and bully for them. Mashaw is wrong anyway because the
fulcrum of legislative responsibility is not the statute, but the floor
fight. With delegation, the floor fight is avoided because almost all
legislators can vote for a bill that calls for clean air and jobs too.
That is why the 1970 Clean Air Act passed almost unanimously.67
64 In a related passage, Mashaw states:
Nor does specificity help voters police for inconsistency in legislators' ideological
positions. Indeed, it would seem to me much easier for a voter to detect the in-
consistency in a legislator's statement that he or she intended "to protect the
public health through strict air quality regulation while avoiding any serious
economic dislocation" than by attempting to figure out that the specific provi-
sions of a bill were indeed trading off these values and in precisely what ways.
MASHAW, supra note 7, at 147. I wonder how Mashaw would tell voters to evaluate
President Clinton's statement in the 1998 State of the Union Address that:
[t]he vast majority of scientists have concluded unequivocally that if we don't
reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, at some point in the next century we'll
disrupt our climate and put our children and grandchildren at risk. This past
December, America led the world to reach a historic agreement committing our
nation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through market forces, new tech-
nologies, energy efficiency. We have it in our power to act right here, right now.
I propose $6 billion in tax cuts and research and development to encourage in-
novation, renewable energy, fuel-efficient cars, energy-efficient homes. Every
time we have acted to heal our environment, pessimists have told us it would
hurt the economy. Well, today our economy is the strongest in a generation, and
our environment is the cleanest in a generation. We have always found a way to
clean the environment and grow the economy at the same time. And when it
comes to global warming, we'll do it again.
President Bill Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the State of the
Union (Jan. 27, 1998), in 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 129, 137 (Feb. 2,1998).
65 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 19-20, 54-57 (discussing the navel orange market
order); id. at 61-67 (discussing the Clean Air Act).
66 See MASHAW, supra note 6, at 147.
67 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 63 & n.19.
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Without delegation, the bill would have to contain clauses like,
"widget plants shall emit no more than X pounds of sulfur per ton
of widgets produced." Such a clause is open to an amendment to
delete it from the bill or substitute "Y pounds" for "X pounds."
Legislators have to stand up and be held accountable on the hard
choices. That is why one of the only contested provisions of the
1970 Clean Air Act was on the amendments to the one true law in
the statute-limiting emissions from new cars by ninety percent.68
Floor fights are newsworthy and attract public interest. The local
papers will point out how the local representatives voted. By the
next election, legislators will have made many controversial
choices. They will be known for how they act on hard choices and
not just for what they say.
Unlike Mashaw, members of Congress understand that dele-
gation lets them avoid responsibility. That is why they go to great
lengths to use delegation to avoid blame not only for regulation,
but also for raising their own salaries.69 If, as Mashaw argues, leg-
islators do not truly avoid blame through delegation, they would
not be so reluctant to invoke the Congressional Review Act to try
to repeal agency laws with which they disagree.
In an attempt to show that ending delegation would be of no
benefit, Mashaw points out that spending bills are full of detail, yet
"perhaps nowhere in American politics do legislators make better
use of selective information and creative incoherence than in ex-
plaining to the American people what has been done in con-
structing the federal budget."70 Mashaw is right about the legisla-
tive appropriations process, but he is wrong to think that
legislative lawmaking would work the same way71
There is an accountability loophole in the Constitution for
appropriations, but not lawmaking. The Constitution's provisions
on appropriations were drafted with the expectation that Congress
68 See id. at 73.
69 See Citizens' Commission on Public Services and Compensation, Pub. L. No. 90-206,
81 Stat. 642 (1967) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 351 (1994)).
70 MASHAW, supra note 7, at 147.
71 The opinion by Justice Scalia, concurring in part and dissenting in part, relied upon
history to argue that Congress could allow the President discretion not to spend appropri-
ated monies. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2115-18 (1998). In my
book, I argued that such discretion is not a delegation of legislative power. See
SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 180, 186-88, 190-91. However, the Line Item Veto Act not
only gave the President discretion not to spend, but also to take away the power from fu-
ture Presidents to spend that money. See Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 403-20. For that reason, I
believe that the majority was correct to conclude that the act delegated an Article I legisla-
tive power.
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would not run planned budget deficits except to deal with emer-
gencies. So long as Congress acted according to that expectation,
it could not benefit one interest group without hurting some other
group by reducing an appropriation or imposing a tax. Thus, in-
terest would tend to thwart interest, as James Madison predicted.73
When that balanced budget expectation collapsed, more than a
century later, Congress could give to Paul without seeming to take
from Peter, because the cost of the appropriation is flung forward
in time to be borne by persons yet to be identified. In contrast,
with lawmaking, a law that benefits Paul will restrict Peter now,
and Peter generally will have notice of this law and know whom to
blame.
Congress takes further advantage of the loophole in account-
ability for appropriations by lumping thousands of spending items
together and voting on them wholesale. There is an implicit
agreement in the Senate by which most members do not support
amendments that strike items of spending, even those with support
in their own states. The reason for the deal is that if such items
were individually subject to vote, each senator would lose the abil-
ity to deliver pork to his constituents. What holds these thieves'
agreement together is that no senator has a Peter for a constituent
who is complaining loudly that a particular item of spending hurts
him. But Peter is there when Congress imposes rules of conduct.
Unlike the appropriations' agreements, an agreement to prevent
the rule-by-rule consideration of proposed laws would collapse
under its own weight.
In sum, just because the Constitution has a loophole that
permits legislators to hide the ball on spending is no excuse to let
them violate the Constitution by hiding the ball on lawmaking.
Even if Mashaw were somehow correct in asserting that dele-
72 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1998, at 15 (1997):
[E]xcept for periods of war (when spending for defense increased sharply), de-
pressions or other economic downturns (when receipts fell precipitously), the
Federal budget was generally in surplus throughout most of the Nation's first
200 years. For our first sixty years as a Nation (through 1849), cumulative
budget surpluses and deficits yielded a net surplus of $70 million. The Civil War,
along with the Spanish-American War and the depression of the 1890s, resulted
in a cumulative deficit totaling just under $1 billion during the 1850-1900 period.
Between 1901 and 1916, the budget hovered very close to balance every year.
... The traditional pattern of running large deficits only in times of war or eco-
nomic downturns was broken during the rest of the 1980s.
73 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 27-28 (referring to THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51
(James Madison)).
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gation does not hinder voters in picking legislators with similar
ideologies, he is wrong in thinking that there is no loss of democ-
racy. In the democracy that is our birthright under the Constitu-
tion, voters are not consigned to picking representatives in the
hope that their representatives' ideologies will lead them to act in
the future as we want. Rather, we can punish legislators who we
think voted unwisely by removing them from office at the next
election. But with delegation, legislators can distance themselves
from much of the blame that results from making decisions on new
laws.
Even though legislators may personally share our ideological
preferences, political incentives lead them to delegate in ways that
do not produce laws that coincide with our views. For example,
because they escape much of the blame for the inevitable costs of
creating new federal lawmaking programs and also much of the
blame for the inevitable failure of these programs to produce the
benefits promised, legislators are skewed towards creating and
enlarging an agency's lawmaking jurisdiction, making its goals
more ambitious, its methods more intrusive, and its procedures
more complicated. The upshot is that, in lawmaking, the national
government, particularly the executive branch, increasingly takes
jurisdiction over matters that might otherwise be left to the politi-
cal branches of state or local government, the common law, or pri-
vate ordering.
While the problem is often too much regulation, sometimes it
is too little regulation. Because legislators also escape blame for
the resulting disappointments when agencies fail to deliver on
statutory promises, Congress is insensitive to the delay and uncer-
tainty that frequently results when the agency lacks the political
muscle needed to make, expeditiously, the hard choices that Con-
gress ducked.74 What first alerted me to the dangers of delegation
was that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was years
too late in exercising its delegated power to stop the danger posed
to young children from leaded gasoline. I am convinced that the
national government would have dealt with leaded gasoline as a
health hazard years earlier if Congress could not have delegated
that responsibility to the EPA in 1970.71
In sum, even if voters could correctly discern incumbents'
ideologies in the sense that Mashaw means (for example, "pro-
74 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 145-46.
75 See David Schoenbrod, Remarks to the National Resource Defense Council, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 767 (1999).
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business" or "pro-labor"), delegation skews legislators' political
incentives in ways that favor the national class over ordinary vot-
ers. Favoring insiders over outsiders is different than favoring left
over right; remember, Standard Oil was a big proponent of the
New Deal's National Recovery Act. 6
The early proponents of delegation were correct; it is a way to
insulate the "experts" from the pressures of elective politics. Once
the 1970s arrived with their emphasis on participatory democracy
and talk of "power to the people," the rationale in favor of delega-
tion has been repackaged to make it sound less elitist. While the
talk is different, the walk still has all the swagger of "power to the
insiders."
B. Mashaw II: We Can Hold Legislators
Accountable for Delegating
Mashaw also argues that we can hold legislators accountable
for delegating:
The dynamics of accountability apparently involve voters will-
ing to vote upon the basis of their representative's record in the
legislature. [In this sentence, he is correcting the last of the
flaws that I identified in his previous argument.] Assuming that
our current representatives in the legislature vote for laws that
contain vague delegations of authority, we are presumably
holding them accountable for that at the polls. How is it that
we are not being represented?77
Notice that Mashaw's theory allocates to voters the responsi-
bility to stop legislators from delegating rather than allocating to
legislators the responsibility of convincing voters that the Constitu-
tion should be amended to allow delegation.
Mashaw's allocation of responsibility is wrong-headed on
many levels. It is not as if voters get to choose between candidates
who delegate and those who do not. When the Republicans in
Congress think environmental regulation is too aggressive, they do
not replace the Clean Air Act with a regulatory regime in which
Congress takes responsibility or even use the Congressional Re-
view Act to challenge regulations such as the new ambient air
quality standards for ozone and particulate matter. Instead, they
introduce legislation that would delegate in ways that would make
it harder to regulate strictly. Indeed, the Washington Post took ex-
ception to a recent Republican environmental bill on the basis that
76 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 38 & n.45.
77 MASHAW, supra note 7, at 139.
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the way for Congress to change the EPA's priorities is to stop
delegating and start taking some responsibility.78
That will not happen readily, however, because delegation
gives the electoral advantage to those who duck the hard choices.
As I said before, delegation is not so much an issue of left versus
right as insiders versus outsiders.
With insiders having such a significant stake in delegation,
outsiders opposed to delegation face a tremendous organizational
challenge. Moreover, it is hard to get ordinary voters to focus on
the issue. It is human nature to care more about what a particular
piece of legislation does to one directly rather than whether the
process by which the legislation is passed will do indirect harm by
undermining democracy in the long run. Even law students have
to be hit on the head by us professors to get them to look beyond
the direct consequences in cases about the structure of government
and see the long-term stakes. Ordinary voters are apt to care more
whether a particular bill seems to help them than whether it dele-
gates. For example, even in 1970 when there was a public outcry
against Congress because it had dropped the ball on air pollution
by delegating broadly to agencies and Congress promised explic-
itly that it would make the "hard choices," Congress easily got
away with delegating again. The 1970 statute camouflaged its
delegation with the kind of spurious detail that even an expert
such as Jerry Mashaw confuses with nondelegation.79
Despite these organizational and informational obstacles, the
political effort to stop delegation has gained ground in recent
years. Presently, more than seventy representatives and thirteen
senators support a bill to end delegation and alternative bills also
have substantial support." But if this effort does not succeed, and
it may well not, it does not mean that the voters have had fair rep-
resentation on this issue.
Voters would be represented more fairly if delegation were
addressed as the constitutional issue that it is. In 1935 after the
Supreme Court decided the cases striking down instances of dele-
gation, President Roosevelt considered seeking amendments to
the Constitution to authorize delegation but decided to maintain a
"studied silence" on amending the Constitution during the 1936
78 See Editorial, Once Again, Regulatory Reform, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1997, at A14.
79 See Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970 § 202(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1) (1994)).
80 See S. 433, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Sen. Brownback and 12 cosponsors);
H.R. 1036, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Rep. Hayworth and 67 cosponsors).
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presidential election and refrained from initiating the amendment
process afterwards for fear of losing Democratic congressmen
during the 1938 election. In the end, he decided to either pack or
intimidate the Court rather than present the delegation issue to
the public.81 The Court's "change in time that saved nine" was not,
in Bruce Ackerman's term, "a constitutional moment," but rather
a constitutional stupor brought on for the convenience of those in
power in all three branches of the federal government.8 2 It is in
order to guard against such self-dealing that the Constitution re-
quires that the states be involved in the constitutional amendment
process.83
Few people who, unlike professors, are not paid to study and
opine upon the structure of government have the time, knowledge,
and inclination to do the work that Mashaw says voters need to do
to claim their democratic birthright. They must read all the grist in
order to guess candidates' ideologies and then wage a meta-
political campaign to get legislators to assume responsibility for
the hard choices. Like Henry Higgins in My Fair Lady who sings,
"Why can't a woman be more like a man," 84  Mashaw argues,
"Why can't ordinary voters be more like me?" Because they are
not, for delegation still means "power to the insiders."
C. Mashaw III: We Still Have Democracy Because
the President Is Accountable for the Laws
Mashaw also argues in a section entitled "Accountability in a
Presidential System" that "the flexibility that is currently built into
the processes of administrative governance by relatively broad
delegations of statutory authority permits a more appropriate de-
gree of administrative, or administration, responsiveness to the
voter's will than would a strict nondelegation doctrine."85
Notice that Mashaw talks about "responsiveness" not respon-
sibility. In other words, he claims that the administration will give
voters what they want, not that it will be more meaningfully ac-
81 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 160-62.
82 See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453,
457-61, 510-15. (1989).
83 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
84 MY FAIR LADY (Warner Bros. 1964).
85 MASHAW, supra note 7, at 153. Part of what Mashaw is talking about in this passage
is that true legislative specificity would require a great deal of detail in the administrative
lawmaking process. That argument is wide off the mark because, as I have already
pointed out, Mashaw confuses the issue of specificity-vagueness with the issue of whether
Congress has delegated the power to make the laws. Thus, I focus instead on his main
point that the voters get what they want because the administration is responsive.
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countable for what it does. This is government "for the people,"
not government "by the people."86 Mashaw is correct to refrain
from claiming that the President is meaningfully accountable to
the voters for the laws promulgated by appointees. With delega-
tion, the public loses the right to have both its elected representa-
tives and its elected President take personal responsibility for the
law. In exchange, it gets the right to have someone appointed by
an elected President take responsibility.
The President is not as accountable for agency laws as mem-
bers of Congress are for enacted laws. The President, who does
not have to publicly sign off on agency laws, may deny responsi-
bility for them. Moreover, the Framers included the requirement
that bills be presented to the President not out of any sense that
the President was more accountable than Congress, but rather be-
cause the President was less accountable to particular interest
groups and thus more inclined to protect liberty.87 A President has
less reason than a member of Congress to worry that a position
taken on a particular law will affect reelection prospects. The
President's responsibility for any one law is, after all, diluted by
the electorate's concern about a host of other issues involving, for
example, national defense, foreign affairs, and law enforcement.
In any event, voters who would disagree with any one agency
law are likely to agree with others. Since voters must take or leave
presidential positions wholesale, it is unlikely that the President
will suffer much political tension over any one agency law. Of
course, voters must also take or leave legislative positions whole-
sale when they elect members of Congress, but in any one legisla-
tive district there are likely to be only a limited number of issues of
particular local concern. A position taken by an incumbent on any
one such issue could cause five percent of the voters to choose the
challenger, thereby producing a ten percent swing. That risk
would force many incumbents to pay careful attention to constitu-
ents' concerns when voting on a law. Given the difficulty of hold-
ing the President accountable for the laws that bureaucrats adopt,
it is no wonder that we tend to think of countries where only the
chief executive is elected as undemocratic.8"
86 Cf. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Get-
tysberg (Nov. 19, 1863), in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 17 (Ray P.
Bassler ed., 1953).
87 See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 5, at 494-96.
88 The Supreme Court does rely on the accountability of the President to justify courts
deferring to agencies on matters of statutory interpretation. See Chevron v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Court's point is that presidential ap-
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Why does Mashaw think that an administration that is demo-
cratically accountable to the voters in only a very diluted sense
would be more responsive to the voters' wishes? He does not ex-
plain why the administration should be responsive at all but im-
plicitly assumes that it will be so. Unspoken, but still there, is the
old national class conceit that experts, if left to their devices, will
act in the public interest. So, yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus,
but it is worth considering why Saint Nick, the agency administra-
tor, will pay much attention to the voters' desires other than to
prevent the President from losing the next election, assuming it is
still the first term. One possibility is that Saint Nick does not want
to stir up public opinion to such an extent that Congress will trim
the agency's power. This might explain why the EPA under Presi-
dents Ford and Carter did not use its power to make Los Angeles
cut gasoline supplies by eighty percent to meet Clean Air Act
deadlines and why the EPA under President Reagan did not scrap
the regulations that were slowly reducing the lead content of gaso-
line.89 So long as the agency does not profoundly anger large
numbers of voters, and instead only slightly irritates large numbers
of voters or badly harms only smaller numbers, it need not fear
that Congress will take away its power.
Now, it would be nice to think that Saint Nick would use his
freedom of action in the public interest, but agencies, and the ad-
ministrations of which they are a part, have numerous agendas that
involve coalition building. Such "log rolling" is reason to suspect
Mashaw's unspoken premise that the agency will be "responsive."
Mashaw's explicit argument is not that the administration is
responsive, but that Congress cannot be. In particular, he conjures
up the possibility of a "Law of Conservation of Administrative
Discretion" under which it is difficult for Congress to decide too
many of the specifics of government such that any attempt to do so
will lead to a wooden form of administration, unresponsive to the
popular will. Here, again, Mashaw confuses the issue of specificity
with that delegation. To avoid delegating, Congress need only
state the law. It can leave to others discretion in matters such as
law interpretation, prosecutorial discretion, and remedy. I have
explained elsewhere why that allocation of responsibility not only
accords with the requirements of Article I, but also with its pur-
pointees are more accountable than judges, not that the accountability of presidential ap-
pointees is a sufficient replacement for the accountability of legislators. See id. at 856-66.
89 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 67-72.
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poses.9° As for the one area where Congress cannot delegate-
making the laws-agencies are sometimes much slower than Con-
gress.9"
Moreover, there are many ways that delegation reduces,
rather than increases, discretion outside of Congress. As already
discussed, delegation skews political incentives so that jurisdiction
is shifted to national administrative agencies from the political
branches of state and local regulators, common law courts, and
private ordering. There is reason to believe that delegation has
encouraged far more such centralization than we need or that we
would have had if members of Congress had taken responsibility
for the laws.9" Rigidity is introduced not just through the centrali-
zation of control, but also through the formalistic rule-bound
methods of federal administrative law that are far more rigid than
what it often replaces. For example, a city council can directly de-
cide how to respond to a particular local environmental problem,
while when the EPA has jurisdiction, local responses must be in
accord with an elaborately detailed federal chain of command.93
Mashaw has a second and final reason for claiming that the
administration is more responsive-Arrow's Theorem. Arrow's
Theorem states that, under certain conditions, democratic choices
cannot be stable. An explanation of the theorem goes as follows:
Assume that three children-Alice, Bobby, and Cindy-have
been pestering their parents for a pet. The parents agree that
the children may vote to have a dog, a parrot, or a cat. Suppose
each child's order of preference is as follows: Alice-dog, par-
rot, cat; Bobby-parrot, cat, dog; Cindy-cat, dog, parrot. In
this situation, if pairwise voting is required, then majority voting
cannot pick a pet.94
A majority (Alice and Cindy) will vote for a dog rather than a
90 See id. at 180-82.
91 Dan Kahan would like to see Congress be able to delegate to the Department of
Justice the power to make the criminal laws in the hope that it will be more responsive
than Congress. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110
HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996). I would need to know a lot more about criminal law than I do
to comment on Kahan's various examples, but I have two comments. First, as to one of
Kahan's most troubling examples, RICO, it seems likely that a delegation doctrine with
teeth would have been killed at birth. Second, many of the other problems that Kahan
raises might be cured through the Department of Justice issuing rules of interpretation.
92 See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AMERICAN
BUSINESS, TIME FOR THE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ARISTOCRACY TO GIVE UP
POWER (1998).
93 See id.
94 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 873, 902 (1987).
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parrot; a majority (Alice and Bobby) will vote for a parrot
rather than a cat; and a majority (Bobby and Cindy) will vote
for a cat rather than a dog.95
In these rather peculiar circumstances, a majority will never
reach a stable conclusion. Relying on Arrow's Theorem, Mashaw
concludes that "delegating choice to administrators is but another
way of avoiding voting cycles through the establishment of dicta-
tors."96 "Dictators" is, as I have been arguing, not that far from the
right word.
While Arrow's Theorem may give Alice, Bobby, and Cindy a
reason to delegate to their parents the choice of their pet, it does
not give Congress a plausible excuse to delegate to agencies the
task of making law. Empirical research has shown that Congress is
not prey to the kind of voting cycles that plague these hypothetical
children. Moreover, the assumptions upon which Arrow premised
his theorem do not hold true in the United States Congress. For
example, Arrow's Theorem assumes that voters' preferences are
not arrayed along some continuum, but rather are topsy-turvy, like
those of Alice, Bobby, and Cindy. However, studies show that
preferences within Congress tend to be arrayed along a liberal-
conservative continuum.97
In addition, only experts, certainly not real parents, would
choose such a stupid way to select the family pet. Nor were the
Framers so stupid in designing the Article I legislative process.
Even if the House or Senate were caught in a voting cycle over
dogs, cats, and parrots, an individual President would not be, and
additionally the President may veto any legislation. Of course, the
House and the Senate can override a presidential veto if a two-
thirds majority of both bodies so vote. Overrides of vetoes are un-
likely to lead to voting cycles. As theorists have recently shown,
based upon some plausible assumptions about voting preferences,
a requirement of at least a sixty-four percent majority will ordi-
95 Id. at 902 n.172.
96 Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Deci-
sions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 98 (1985).
97 The research on absence of cycling in Congress is collected and discussed in DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 48-49 (1991). For policy changes by agencies, see William T. Mayton,
The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of
Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 961-62. For discussion
of Arrow's assumptions, see, for example, ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS
CRITICS 153-54 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 89-94 (1990). See also Mayton, supra at 953-58.
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narily prevent voting cycles.98 In sum, Arrow's Theorem is inter-
esting, but it provides no excuse for delegating to Mashaw's dicta-
tors.
D. Mashaw and Welfare
As the discussion of accountability of the President shows,
Mashaw attempts to prove that delegation is compatible with
democratic accountability by arguing that it enhances welfare.
That is why he uses the language of "responsiveness" rather than
"responsibility." While this panel's topic is the impact of delega-
tion on democracy not welfare (and I believe in separation of pan-
els), I cannot resist a few brief comments on Mashaw's argument
that delegation enhances welfare.
Mashaw suggests that delegation enhances welfare by avoid-
ing logrolling in Congress. His argument is to put lawmaking in
the hands of an executive that he labels "responsive" to the voters.
He fails to notice that logrolling takes place in the Executive as
well, although it goes by different names, such as "coalition build-
ing." His is an argument by characterization.
Mashaw is also incorrect in dismissing the arguments of Peter
Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen Robinson that the blame-
shifting allowed by delegation reduces welfare.99 Mashaw writes
that their "claim rests on a much more general proposition-that
the free play of political life, assuming self-interested constituents
and self-interested legislators, makes all legislation disbeneficial
(or most of it anyway)."l"' He goes on to dispute the more general
proposition. Let us say that Mashaw is correct. Suppose that bills
with a prospect of passage are evenly split between those that pro-
duce more benefits than costs and those that produce more costs
than benefits. Even under this supposition, Aranson, Gellhorn,
and Robinson are correct in their claim that the blame-shifting al-
lowed by delegation reduces welfare. After all, the blame-shifting
skews the political incentives faced by legislators, desensitizing
them to the blame they deserve for costs they indirectly impose
and the benefits they indirectly withhold by consigning laws
needed now to the limbo of agency rulemaking.
98 See Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff, On 64%-Majority Rule, 56 ECONOMETRICA
787 (1988). Mashaw and others have raised a number of second order objections to how
Article I avoids voting cycles. I deal with these arguments in SCHOENBROD, supra note 6,
at 132-34.
99 See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 36-37 (1982).
100 MASHAW, supra note 7, at 143.
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Whether delegation enhances or reduces welfare depends
upon a number of other factors such as agency expertise, differ-
ences in the politics of agency and legislative lawmaking, differ-
ences in agency and legislative procedures, judicial review, and
others. I have stated at length elsewhere why I think that, on bal-
ance, delegation does more harm to welfare than good.10'
Mashaw's book is unresponsive to my arguments about delegation
and welfare. It would be pointless to repeat my arguments here.
Whether delegation reduces welfare and democracy is impor-
tant as a matter of politics and policy but should be largely irrele-
vant as to whether it is constitutional. If the constitutionality of
departures from the letter of Article I of the Constitution rides too
much on instrumental analysis, then what Article I requires be-
comes a question of policy. On policy issues, the political process
ordinarily should and does trump the judicial process. The upshot
is that the politicians get to make the constitutional ground rules of
government as they go along. The upshot is the kind of ersatz de-
mocracy that we now have.
III. PROFESSOR KAHAN AND MAKING
NONSENSE OF "DEMOCRACY"
Professor Kahan responds to my claim that delegation under-
cuts democracy with an essay entitled Democracy, Schmemoc-
racy.12 His premise is that democracy is an empty concept; his
conclusion is that my claim is devoid of meaning.
His premise is incorrect. He tries to show that "democracy"
lacks any core content by suggesting two quite different concepts
of the word-a pluralist conception in which "official decisions
conform to the aggregated preferences of the electorate"'0 3 and a
civic republican conception in which "official decisions are reached
through a process of reflective deliberation.'" 4 He then shows that
no form of government uniquely maximizes both of these concepts
of democracy and that delegation might be argued to increase
both.
Professor Kahan misdefines democracy. The root meaning of
the word is, from the Greek, for rule by the people. The primary
definition in the dictionary is "government by the people exercised
directly or through elected representatives," and none of the sec-
101 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 5,7-12.
102 Kahan, supra note 8.
103 Id. at 796.
104 Id. at 797.
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ondary definitions correspond to Kahan's.' Kahan's pluralist
conception of democracy is not democracy. It speaks to whether
government gives the people what they want, not whether the
people exercise direct or indirect control over it. It is like
Mashaw's version, "government for the people," not "government
by the people."1 °6
Kahan's civic republican spin on democracy is also not de-
mocracy. It speaks to the process by which the rulers decide, not
whether the people have a role in ruling themselves.
As Professor Kahan misunderstands democracy, a govern-
ment run by a benign philosopher king would constitute a perfect
democracy. Professor Kahan is one dictionary short of being an
effective apologist for the administrative state.
Kahan's understanding of democracy is impoverished, as well
as mistaken. He understands it as some compromise between self-
rule, where the people rule themselves directly, and paternalism,
where the people are ruled by philosopher-experts. But the Fram-
ers opted neither for direct democracy nor paternalism. They
opted for an indirect democracy in which representatives of the
people ruled, but only through a legislative process in which dif-
ferent groups of elected officials checked and balanced each
other.107 As Professor Marci Hamilton explains, many of the most
reflective of the Framers believed that representatives owe their
constituents their conscience, not slavish adherence.0 8 These
Framers viewed our democracy as based on leadership and ac-
countability. Kahan views democracy as some balance between
followership and nonaccountability.
Kahan's conception not only dilutes accountability, but also
makes the entire enterprise of government less reflective, from top
to bottom. The Framers wanted Congress to be forced to face the
hard choices partly because voters would learn from the clashes
between the representatives of voters with opposing desires. In
contrast, under Kahan's dumbed-down conception of democracy,
elected legislators get to avoid the hard choices by delegating. At
best, this means that voters do not get to learn by seeing their rep-
resentatives wrestle with the hard choices. At worst, this means
that the representatives pretend no choice has to be made in in-
structing the delegates to produce benefits without costs. The
105 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 380 (2d ed. 1991).
106 Cf. Lincoln, supra note 86.
107 See Marci Hamilton, supra note 5, at 812.
108 See id. at 813.
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delegates are left with the unedifying job of providing political
cover for the legislators. For example, we have the spectacle un-
der the Clean Air Act of the EPA pretending that it sets ambient
air quality standards without regard to cost. The upshot is neither
accountability nor reflection.
Despite his loud protests of semantic ambiguity, Professor
Kahan understands full well the core meaning of democracy. It is
the visceral appeal of this core meaning that makes him set out, as
he acknowledges, to try to deflect the charge that delegation un-
dercuts democracy." 9 He is thinking, I suppose, that no one can
claim delegation undercuts democracy when there is no one, cor-
rect design for a democracy, as the word is commonly understood.
A democracy can be direct or indirect. If indirect, various powers
can be granted to a single elected official or to a chamber of them,
there may be one legislative chamber or more, the terms of office
may be X years or more, and, directly relevant to the delegation
issue, the power to make law may be allocated to one set of offi-
cials or another. Moreover, in selecting between alternative de-
signs, maximizing democratic accountability is only one of the con-
siderations. Indeed, the Framers were also concerned with the
pluralistic and civic republican virtues that Kahan claims to mis-
take for democracy.
While there are many possible designs for a democracy, there
is one particular design for democracy in the Constitution. It was
understood to require, as I argued at length in my book, that the
power and responsibility for lawmaking be in the legislative proc-
ess.11 With that as my benchmark, I argued that delegation signifi-
cantly reduces democratic accountability. "1 Whether it in fact
does do so is the issue that separates Jerry Mashaw and me.
Professor Kahan claims that I have no sure benchmark be-
cause he says it is debatable whether the Constitution was in-
tended to require that the laws be made in the legislative proc-
ess." ' His argument at this juncture is even thinner than when it
tries to reduce democracy to rule by a benign despot. It amounts
to one sentence in which he invokes the debate about whether the
Framers believed in a complete separation of powers.113 Clearly
they did not, as can be seen, for example, in the Presentment
109 See Kahan, supra note 8, at 795.
110 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 47-48, 155-64, 174-79.
111 See id. at 84-96, 99-106.
112 See Kahan, supra note 8, at 800.
113 See id. at 805.
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Clause, which gives the President a limited veto over Congress's
exercise of legislative powers."4 But whether the Framers believed
in complete separation of powers is besides the point. The delega-
tion issue is not whether there will be complete separation of pow-
ers, but rather whether the elected representatives will be on the
hook for the kind of hard choices identified in Article I.
Believing the Constitution to be ambiguous on whether dele-
gation of the power to make law is permitted, Kahan thinks he has
caught opponents of delegation in a bootstrap argument. He
claims that the only way we can overcome the ambiguity in the
Constitution is by claiming that delegation undercuts democracy.115
Here, again, Kahan is incorrect. The argument that the Con-
stitution forbids delegation is based upon the text and context of
the Constitution, the understandings of the Framers, and the judi-
cial interpretations closest in time to the Constitution's adoption. I
will not repeat the arguments here because I have recorded them
elsewhere.1 6 The point is that the democracy-based argument is
not the primary argument for the claim that the Constitution for-
bids delegation, but rather one of the reasons why the Framers in-
tended the Constitution to forbid delegation. It is the proponents
of delegation who have placed critical reliance on democracy.
Seeking to change the subject by turning from formalism to in-
strumentalism, they claim that delegation should be constitutional
because it does not undercut democracy.17
Overall, Kahan's essay does not explore the question of
whether delegation undercuts democratic accountability. Instead,
he too attempts to change the subject by inviting us to speculate on
whether there is a correct way to design a government that is
democratic (as he uses the word). I decline to accept his invitation
because it is a diversion. It diverts us into thinking that our gov-
ernment is shaped by professors theorizing rather than politicians
entrenching themselves in office. These politicians are the ones
with the power to redesign the ground rules of government for
their convenience, unless we force them to remember that the ba-
sic purpose of a written constitution is to stop them from doing so.
Professor Kahan's critique by misdefinition and misdirection
fails to oust opponents of delegation from the high ground. We
can still rightly protest, without qualification, that delegation un-
114 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
115 See Kahan, supra note 8, at 795.
116 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 47-48, 155-64, 174-79.




IV. PROFESSOR SCHUCK AND DELEGATION AS A POLICY ISSUE
Professor Peter Schuck has a quiver full of criticisms in his Ar-
ticle, but the ones that do not reiterate those of Mashaw and Ka-
han boil down to this: "[Schoenbrod] does not see that the level
and type of delegation are themselves fundamental policy choices,
and that these issues ... are almost always-and quite explicitly-
at the core of political debates in Congress over the shape and con-
tent of particular pieces of legislation."" 8 Because, for Schuck,
delegation is a policy issue for the political branches to handle, the
courts should stay away from what is not fit business for them. In
his opinion, delegation is a "political question," 119 although he does
not explicitly invoke that doctrine. After talking of plunging "a
long, sharp knife deep into the [delegation] doctrine's heart,"'120 he
makes this final thrust: "Professor Schoenbrod, usually so sensible
about such things, would surely deplore it." '121
Not all advice from good friends is good, especially when one
misunderstands the other, as Schuck does me. Schuck misunder-
stands me when he says that I do not see that delegation has im-
portant policy ramifications. Of course I do; in fact, my book has
two chapters on those ramifications. 22 What Schuck does not see
is that delegation is one of those policy choices that is controlled
by the Constitution. Were all issues with policy implications off
limits to the courts, they would largely be out of the business of
constitutional review. The Constitution is a series of policy
choices, often about how government should make policy.'23 The
Constitution is written precisely so that politicians cannot change
these meta-policy choices.
Schuck does not argue that the Constitution allows delegation
but rather marshals arguments that he might use, were he writing a
constitution, to explain why his draft would leave the choice on
delegation to the legislature. He argues delegation is necessary for
national welfare partly because "social complexity has made it far
more difficult for legislators (not to mention voters) to accurately
predict the consequences of their choices so that they can reason
118 Schuck, supra note 9, at 781.
119 Cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962).
120 Schuck, supra note 9, at 776.
121 Id. at 775.
122 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 119-52.




their way to a conclusion as to the best policy choice." '124 For him,
the agency is the best place to make the law "not only because the
details of the regulatory impacts are hammered out there. It is
also because the agency is where the public can best educate the
government about the true nature of the problem that Congress
has tried to address." '25 Furthermore, "[i]n short, it is only at the
agency level that the citizen can know precisely what the statute
means to her; how, when, and to what extent it will affect her in-
terests; whether she supports, opposes, or wants changes in what
the agency is proposing .... "126
Delegation is the reason, however, that it is only at the agency
level that legislators or anyone else have any understanding of
what is at stake. With delegation, legislation is mainly concerned
with promising the best of everything to everyone, yet it is only
when laws are passed that rights are actually linked to duties.
Were Congress to make the law, the stakes would become appar-
ent to legislators (and their constituents) at the legislative level,
which is precisely why legislators avoid accountability and dele-
gate.
To get a clearer picture of what those stakes are, Congress
could make a number of policy choices other than delegation. It
could ask the agency to recommend a draft with an accompanying
analysis of the consequences. It could target whatever law it en-
acts at the specific problems that sparked congressional attention
(e.g., lead in gasoline, emissions from new cars) rather than, as it
often does with delegation, launch a regulatory program designed
to address a far larger set of problems (e.g., air pollution from
every source from big factories to the corner dry-cleaner) in order
to obscure the fact that it has not resolved the issues that most
concern its constituents. Congress could also leave more issues to
state and local government and private action.
Delegation skews Congress's political incentives toward
granting federal agencies comprehensive jurisdiction over large ar-
eas of policy, much of which could be left to state and local gov-
ernment. For example, air pollution was being reduced at a rela-
tively steady rate from at least the beginning of the twentieth
century.127 The data do not show any uptick in the rate of im-
124 Schuck, supra note 9, at 778.
125 Id. at 782.
126 Id.
127 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 92, at 8.
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provement when the federal government took over in 1970.128
Schuck seems to think that Congress acts in the public interest
when it decides to delegate. As he sees the legislative process, the
"legislative staffs, the White House, regulated firms, 'public inter-
est' groups, state and local governments, and others [fight over the
scope and terms of the delegation.]' 29 He implies that the balance
struck in the legislative fight produces something like the right re-
sult.
Schuck distrusts legislators to make laws but trusts them in
deciding whether to delegate. I distrust them when they make
laws and distrust them more when they delegate. Legislators have
selfish interests in deciding whether to delegate and so have a con-
flict of interest. Through delegation, they can claim credit, shift
blame, and increase the demand for casework as a means for them
to exact campaign contributions and other favors. The stake-
holders from the private sector, in contrast, aim to get the law they
want, wherever it is made. For them, delegation is only a possible
means to that end. The balance on delegation that might be pro-
duced by the tugging and hauling between the competing private
stakeholders is knocked out of wack by the heavy hands of those
with the biggest stakes in delegation and the power to do it, the
legislators.
Not only does Schuck blink at the selfish interests of the leg-
islators, he also puts too much faith in the idea that all the relevant
interests are represented. Just because many well organized inter-
est groups are active in the contest does not guarantee a good out-
come as the well organized interests are only a part of the overall
public interest. The unorganized interests are the ones most prone
to be harmed by delegation.
Schuck also suggests that agencies use their delegated powers
well. He does so by taking me to task for writing in the initial draft
of my paper that agencies are free "to do as they please."'3 ° I did
write in discussing those occasions where Congress might "trim the
agency's power ...[that] so long as the agency does not pro-
foundly anger large numbers of voters-and instead only slightly
irritates large numbers of voters or really screws much smaller
numbers-it is free to do as it pleases."'' I was rebutting the ar-
128 In another context, Schuck kindly provided me with citations of other comprehen-
sive federal programs that have not produced better results than their state, local, and pri-
vate antecedents.
129 Id. at 781.
130 Id. at 777.
131 See David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20
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gument that the power of Congress to repeal the agency rule or cut
back its delegated powers works to reconcile delegation with de-
mocracy. Schuck has taken my unfortunately hyperbolic language,
literally and out of context, to be a claim that agencies are unre-
strained. This I do not believe, as is clear from my book where I
discuss multiple constraints on agency action and the problem of
agency paralysis.'32
That the agencies are constrained does not necessarily make
what they produce good. None of the sources of constraint that
Schuck invokes can rightly be claimed to filter out bad laws and
force imposition of good ones. Congress and the White House are
at their least accountable in the many open, and not so open, ways
that they lean on agencies engaged in making laws. The courts
cannot demand that agencies produce good laws, they can only re-
quire superficially plausible reasons for the laws that agencies do
produce.
Public participation is also not much of a solace. According to
Schuck, "[t]oday, the administrative agency is often the site where
public participation in lawmaking is most accessible, most mean-
ingful, and most effective." '133 But the average member of the pub-
lic lacks the lawyers and experts needed for meaningful participa-
tion. The most average citizens can do is write a letter, whether to
an agency or a representative. The letter will probably result in lit-
tle in either case but is more likely to count when the law is being
made by the representative who wants our vote, than the agency
official who wants a bigger office. What Schuck really means by
public participation is participation by the leadership of various in-
terest groups, be they unions, corporations, and cause-based
groups. Interest group leaders do monitor agencies, but usually
only on issues of the most direct interest to the leadership. The
broadest and most important public interests have little if any rep-
resentation. To show just how delegation hurts unorganized inter-
ests-in fact and not just in theory-was the point of the extended
case studies in my book.134
Schuck argues that delegation could not be that much of a
problem because our country is prosperous and our government
functions reasonably well compared to governments elsewhere.
This is despite delegation, not because of it. The credit for our
CARDOZO L. REV. 731 (1999) (draft of Sept. 1, 1998, on file with Cardozo Law Review).
132 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 82-84,111-18, 121-26.
133 Schuck, supra note 9, at 781.
134 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 56-57, 63-67.
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success belongs much more, I think, to other factors such as a free
press and checks and balances, both of which are vitiated by dele-
gation. Delegation removes lawmaking from the center stage of
politics, that most worthy of press attention. It frees lawmaking
from the requirement that both houses of Congress and the Presi-
dent take affirmative responsibility.
While the constraints on delegation may avoid the very worst
laws that might otherwise come from agencies, to rest content with
that and to say there is no problem, as Schuck does, is to miss the
bigger picture. Inherent in delegation is a bias towards more
regulation, more centralized and complicated regulation, because
lawmakers escape most of the blame for launching sweeping
regulations that promise more than can be delivered and impose
costs for which legislators would not take responsibility if they had
to make the hard choice. In other words, society is deprived of the
most direct means to decide how much it wants to be controlled by
government. Rather, that decision is ceded, in substantial meas-
ure, to a government run by legislators who want to entrench
themselves in office, agency officials who want to enlarge their
budgets, and interest group leaders whose livelihoods and power
grow in our thriving administrative state.
The genius of our Constitution was that the people would get
to decide how much government they want. If, as Schuck believes,
the people's welfare would be advanced by giving up some of that
decisional power, let the people so decide through the constitu-
tional amendment process. Instead, the insiders have done that
for them.
Schuck argues that courts should abstain from tackling the
delegation issue because "it would greatly strengthen the power of
the federal courts relative to that of Congress and the agencies."' 35
For Schuck, such a shift of power "is particularly obnoxious when,
as in this case, it is not essential to the vindication of enumerated
constitutional rights." '136 Schuck does not explain why it is not also
obnoxious for courts to make what he would have to label "policy
choices" on what parts of the Constitution are worthy of enforce-
ment.
Schuck goes on to argue that the courts lack a judicially man-
ageable test of unconstitutional delegation. The test that I propose
in my book rides on the difference between lawmaking and law in-
terpretation. I devote a chapter to explaining that, despite the
135 Schuck, supra note 9, at 790.
136 Id. at 790-91.
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slippery nature of these concepts, the test is no worse than other
constitutional tests.'37 Schuck does not take issue with my argu-
ment but rather misunderstands it. He writes: "How general is
too general, how specific is specific enough-these are, contrary to
Professor Schoenbrod's claim, questions of degree, not kind. They
are preeminently questions of politics and of policy that courts are
poorly equipped to answer ....138 My test does not ride on the
concepts of generality or specificity, but rather on the distinction
between lawmaking and law interpretation.
In any event, if Congress concluded that the courts were in-
truding too deeply in policy by enforcing the nondelegation doc-
trine, Congress has an available remedy. It could adopt the idea
floated by Justice Breyer to enact a statute under which agency
rules would not go into effect without being enacted by Con-
gress.'39 Then there could never be any delegation, and thus courts
would have nothing to rule upon. As a result, Schuck can get most
of the advantages that he thinks come from the agency process.
Schuck also predicts that the Supreme Court will never put
teeth into the delegation doctrine.40 I am not a prophet, but I do
believe that a vibrant democracy is a possibility, not a certainty or
an impossibility. The outcome is a choice, not a certainty. I wish
that Schuck, who puts so much value on being able to make his
own choices, would urge his fellow citizens, including the justices
of the Supreme Court, to insist on a form of government in which
voters would have a more effective choice on the scope of gov-
ernment.
CONCLUSION
The comments on my book made at this symposium and from
other sources have pushed me toward realizing that I need to
broaden my focus beyond a scholarly analysis of delegation and
the power to regulate. Reviews by Judge Douglas Ginsburg and
Professor Harold Krent made me realize that the battle against
delegation had to be fought in the court of politics as well as the
137 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6, at 180-91.
138 Schuck, supra note 9, at 791. He also writes, "[r]esolution of these questions,
moreover, depends entirely on context-or, as Professor Schoenbrod recognizes, on a
'slew of other factors."' Id. at 791. The "slew of other factors" quote is taken out of con-
text. My point was not that courts should look at the context in deciding whether the text
of a statute made the law.
139 See Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 793-94
(1984).
140 See Schuck, supra note 9, at 791.
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courts of law.'41 Phillip Howard's comments at the symposium that
a lack of responsibility is pervasive in Washington and is not lim-
ited to Congress underscored my desire to show that shirking by
Congress is part of that broader picture. 4 2 William Niskanen's
comment at the symposium that delegation cannot end without re-
turning much power to the states underscored my desire to link the
argument against delegation with an argument for federalism. 143
Peter Schuck's claim that ending delegation would rock a prosper-
ous ship of state underscored my desire to explain in popularly un-
derstandable terms the real harm done to society by an overlarge,
irresponsible national government. In other words, delegation of
regulatory lawmaking power is only one aspect of a more pro-
found disease in our body politic. The challenge I recognize is to
explain that disease to people who do not deem themselves ex-
perts.
I am working on a new book that attempts to paint this
broader picture. With that work in progress, this symposium's fo-
cused on delegation forced me to paint on a canvas narrower than
the picture in my mind. Yet, the symposium has energized me be-
cause the contributions from all sides have been so good and be-
cause it was with delegation that I first saw, from personal experi-
ence-how politicians' subversions of the Constitution undercut
democracy and hurt real people.
141 See Douglas Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 18 REG. 83 (reviewing
SCHOENBROD, supra note 6); Harold Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 710 (1994) (same).
142 See Phillip Howard, Comments at the Cardozo Law Review symposium "The Phoe-
nix Rises Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine from Constitutional and Policy Perspec-
tives" (Mar. 19,1998) (transcript on file with the Cardozo Law Review).
143 See William A. Niskanen, Legislative Implications of Reasserting Congressional
Authority over Regulations, 20 CARDOzO L. REV. 939 (1999).
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